




Mais attention.  Ce que nous appelons désordre et ruine, d’autres, plus jeunes, le vivent comme naturel 
et peut-être vont-ils avec ingénuité le dominer justement parce qu’ils ne cherchent plus leurs références 
où nous les prenions.  Dans le fracas des démolitions, bien des passions moroses, bien des hypocrisies 
ou des folies, bien des dilemmes faux disparaissent aussi.  Qui l’aurait espéré il y a dix ans ?  Peut-être 
sommes-nous à un de ces moments où l’histoire passe outre.  Nous sommes assourdis par les 
événements français ou les épisodes bruyants de la diplomatie.  Mais, au-dessous du bruit, un silence se 
fait, une attente.  Pourquoi ne serait-ce pas un espoir ? 
(Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 1960, Signes, Paris, Gallimard, Préface, 41) 
 
But we should be careful.  What we call disorder and ruin, others who are younger live as the natural 
order of things; and perhaps with ingenuity they are going to master it precisely because they no longer 
seek their bearings where we took ours.  In the din of demolitions, many sullen passions, many 
hypocrisies or follies, and many false dilemmas also disappear.  Who would have hoped it ten years 
ago?  Perhaps we are at one of those moments when history moves on.  We are stunned by French 
affairs or diplomacy’s clamorous episodes.  But underneath the clamor a silence is growing, an 
expectation.  Why could it not be a hope? 
(Maurice Merleau-Ponty, trans. Richard C. McCleary, 1964, Signs, Northwestern University Press, 
Introduction, 23). 
Only about six months after writing these sentences of cautious optimism, Merleau-Ponty died suddenly of a 
heart attack on May 3rd, 1961.  Early in the same year, Pierre Bourdieu returned to Paris from Algeria to become 
secretary to Aron’s research group.  Just over 10 years earlier, in 1950, Merleau-Ponty, aged 42, had been a 
member of the jury selecting entrants to the Ecole Normale Supérieure which had admitted Bourdieu1, aged 20.  




 bearings’ in new directions, and among those who offered Merleau-Ponty grounds for supposing that the ‘many 
false dilemmas’ which had troubled him throughout his career might ‘disappear’. 
Merleau-Ponty had realised late in life that the position which he was adopting, intellectually and professionally, 
was no longer tenable in terms of his own earlier arguments.  One way of summarising my discussion of 
Bourdieu’s work is to state that I believe that he relentlessly pursued the logic of the philosophical positions 
which Merleau-Ponty had balanced, pursuing them beyond the safe house of instituted philosophy into an active 
engagement with the real socio-political world effected by a sociological reflexivity which he refused to allow 
to be equated with a reflexive sociology.  Did Bourdieu’s work eliminate the ‘false dilemmas’ which had 
perplexed Merleau-Ponty? Did Bourdieu find ‘new bearings’ such that he provided the hope that Merleau-Ponty 
expected of the new generation?  The answer to that question depends in part on the way in which his work is 
now used by the new next generation2. 
Although Schutz and Gurwitsch were intellectually the products of continental gymnasium schooling, both 
initiated into the traditions of classical and post-Enlightenment humanist thought, they reacted differently in 
response to the different Austrian and German cultural situations.  Schutz absorbed the work of Bergson and 
Husserl and others, but the attraction for him of phenomenology was that it methodologically legitimated his 
intention to subject inter-personal social relations to unprejudiced scrutiny, not that it supplied him with a valid 
‘philosophy’.  This scrutiny involved understanding the agency of individual selves in constructing social 
reality.  He did not conceive of these acting selves as themselves socially constituted and the constructed social 
reality was autonomously ‘social’ rather than comprehensively societal.  Social scientists perform a role in 
society as particular agents and there are laws which regulate their activity but their role co-exists with other 
roles.  There is no sense in which a prior consciousness inherent in communities establishes the grounds of 
possibility of all juxtaposed modes of action.  Gurwitsch’s endeavours were much more ‘intellectual’, grounded 
in doctoral and Habilitation theses which meticulously evaluated previous schools of thought in respect of 
philosophy and psychology.  Paradoxically, however, Gurwitsch’s intellectual project led him to reject any 
notion of a transcendent ego and to argue that intellectual ‘fields’ are constituted out of pre-rational community 
solidarity.  Intellectual ‘fields’ have no transcendental priority or permanence.  They are not ‘idealist’ but they 
function as objectivities which ensure, equally, that knowledge is never fully reducible to historically contingent 
subjective dispositions.  The fact that he never felt integrated into a social context, either in Europe or in 
America, meant that he was never able to actualise his thinking.  Instead, his theory of ‘fields’ became a theory 
within an intellectual discourse.  Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu were formed in lycées and at the École Normale 




 attempted to implement in political convictions the simultaneous rejection of idealism and existentialism which, 
in part, he absorbed theoretically from the work of Gurwitsch.  In the immediate post World War II period in 
which French society sought to reconstitute itself, Merleau-Ponty turned away from dogmatic acceptance of 
Marxist ideology and advanced, instead, an approach to politics which was a form of applied phenomenology 
which, he hoped, would enable plural world-views to be reconciled through humanist inter-subjective encounter.  
This was the theoretical backdrop to Bourdieu’s experience of the harsh clash of civilizations in Algeria.  
Bourdieu had already resented the social separation effected and consolidated by his privileged schooling and 
the conceptual dualisms, between mind and body, thought and experience, which seemed to be homologuous 
with that separation.  What he observed in Algeria showed him the consequences of the imposition of a colonial 
system on indigenous culture and provided him with a perspective on what he personally experienced within 
France.  Nevertheless, Bourdieu was an ‘oblate’ who could never deny that it was his intellectual formation 
which had given him the language by which to understand the processes of social division about which he was 
passionately hostile.   
I am an ‘oblate’.  Educated in the 1950s in a provincial English grammar school, analoguous with the gymnasia 
or lycées attended by all the authors considered in this text, I was initiated into a scholarly tradition which was 
unfamiliar to my parents such that I gained admission to Cambridge University where my studies culminated in 
the completion of a doctoral thesis on the relationship between natural philosophy and literary fictions at the end 
of the 18th Century, concentrating on the relations between the philosophy of Joseph Priestley and the poetry of 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge.  I was on track to be an aspirant educator in the Humanities.  Contingent events 
intervened and I became a lecturer in 1970 in the newly established North-East London Polytechnic, an 
institution which was in the vanguard of  implementing policies for widening access to higher education and for 
developing a particular course which was designed to enable disadvantaged students to negotiate their curricula, 
a negotiation based upon an encounter between their dispositions and those of the staff who were professionally 
obligated to transmit the bodies of knowledge particular to their specialisms.  I became a prime mover in the 
pedagogic innovation which led to the establishment of the School for Independent Study in 1974 which, with 
hindsight, could be said to have been attempting to institutionalise a negotiated knowledge construction by 
juxtaposing the habitus of students with the interests of staff as representatives of ‘fields’ of learning.  The 
School lasted for 16 years during which time it had enabled students to build on their incorporated cultural 
capital to acquire objectivated capital which, in turn, became instituted through diploma and degree 
qualification.  The School was disbanded in 1990 at the time when the institution felt obliged to safeguard the 




 graduates as it sought to acquire a brand image for itself within the new market of post-binary higher education 
institutions.  During those 16 years I had gradually found that Bourdieu’s work of the 1960s provided me with a 
conceptual framework to analyse, justify and defend my pedagogic practice.  The consequence of the abolition 
of the School for Independent Study was that I redefined the original intellectual interests which had been 
eclipsed by my involvement in innovation.  My doctoral thesis had examined the competing truth claims of 
‘science’ and ‘literature’.  I had no inclination to resurrect a career in the Humanities and found it possible to 
pursue my epistemological interests through an analysis of the development of the thinking of the person whose 
work had helped me interpret my practice.  1990 was a turning–point for Bourdieu as for myself.  In late 
Thatcherite Britain I found that conditions were no longer propitious for the continuation of the practice with 
which I had been involved for almost two decades.  As a substitute, I turned to the objective study of Bourdieu’s 
work on the grounds that its representation would mentally keep alive possibilities which then appeared to be 
actually eliminated.  At the same moment, Bourdieu’s failure intellectually to prevail over the way in which 
American sociology was conceptualising the modern world and contributing to the imposition of that 
conceptualisation on the world, caused him to realise that he needed to transform the conditions of possibility 
for the future by direct action as well as by intellectual endeavour.  He turned to self-presentation at the moment 
when I wrote my first objective account of his work3.  This book continues that objectification, now including 
consideration of the development of Bourdieu’s work from 1990 until his death.  As such, the book comes under 
scrutiny as a mode of communication in relation to the vision which Bourdieu attempted to actualise in his last 
decade. 
Bourdieu had a vision of the world, partly nostalgic and partly utopian, partly derived from his observations of 
the social organization in his native Béarn and in traditional Algeria and partly derived from his commitment to 
the ideals of the French Revolution.  He was committed to an absolute egalitarianism, not ‘equality of 
opportunity’ nor ‘social mobility’ both of which were predicated on procedures of selection within a society in 
which hierarchical distinction remained unchallenged.  He envisaged a society in which individuals might 
encounter each other socio-analytically, might recognize, that is, that differences can be understood and 
tolerated on the grounds that they are not absolute but are the consequences of differential social conditioning, 
thus removing the iniquities of ‘symbolic violence’.  He envisaged a society in which those in authority, whether 
politicians, judges, or businessmen, would recognize that they held that authority by consent, that their authority 
was functional rather than absolute and always amenable to analyses which should continuously disclose the 
ways in which it was socially constituted and, therefore, reversible.  He envisaged a society which would be 




the world operated by a minority of intellectuals whose perspective was subject to scrutiny in the context of a 
social ontology of all individuals.  He envisaged a society which would not be beholden to ‘public intellectuals’ 
but would consist of an intellectual public. 
As a result of my habitus and career trajectory I am disposed to be sympathetic to Bourdieu’s vision and to share 
his sense, as expressed in the 1990s, that the likelihood of its realisation is rapidly diminishing.  The epigraphs 
which I have inserted at the beginning of the book indicate my orientation.  In optimistic moments, I hope, like 
Tennyson’s Ulysses that ‘Some work of noble note, may yet be done’ to make Bourdieu’s vision even 
conceivable again.  This means implementing an historicist, ontological orientation which enables everyone to 
recognize, as Schelling put it, endorsed by Heidegger, the origins of the ‘fundamental thought’ of each other.  In 
“Classement, déclassement, reclassement” of 1978, Bourdieu argued that the young generation was ‘une 
generation abusée’ [an abused generation] (Bourdieu, 1978, 9) because it had been offered future prospects 
through education which were not actually available.  This article was added as an Epilogue to the English 
translation of Les héritiers which was published in 1979.  Colourfully and memorably, Richard Nice rendered 
Bourdieu’s phrase as ‘The Bamboozling of a Generation’ (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979, 83), accurately 
capturing the spirit of Bourdieu’s remark.  Generations have been bamboozled for generations.  The structural 
transformation of the public sphere needs to be re-transformed to accommodate mass democracy, or, as Thomas 
Mann’s character says more generally, ‘it is all up with conventions once considered prerequisite and 
compulsory’. 
 
These are my mere opinions.  There is, of course, the alternative view.  As Aron said of the May Events of 1968, 
Bourdieu’s vision was of ‘une révolution introuvable’ [an unrealisable revolution].  Societies need to be 
managed by bureaucracies.  ‘People’ are quite happy to watch football matches or athletics, to participate in 
royal pageantry, to follow the behaviour of celebrities, all presented to them by the media.  In Ibsen’s The Wild 
Duck, written in 1884, one character, Gregers Werle regards it as his mission to cause another, Hjalmar Ekdal, 
to confront the reality of his situation, to cease self-bamboozlement.  The consequences are disastrous.  Another 
character, Dr, Remming, reprimands Gregers, commenting: ‘Take the saving lie from the average man and you 
take his happiness away, too’ (Ibsen, 1964, 244).  Perhaps this is an absolute truth or perhaps it is indicative of 
the continuing potency of a late 19th Century bourgeois inclination to disparage average people. 
There is, finally, a third possibility.  The world is already very different from the one with which Bourdieu tried 
to deal in the 1990s.  Facebook, for instance, was established in 2004, two years after his death.  Social media 
have, perhaps, eclipsed ‘incorporated’ cultural capital such that social exchanges are becoming homogenised 





 has removed the experience of indebtedness.  Universal connectedness can be seen as the actualisation of inter-
subjectivity, especially if it becomes a vehicle for collective conversion rather than for the celebration of 
narcissistic subjectivity.  In this view, Bourdieu’s project and my discussion of it might both seem retrograde 
prolongations of the philosophical problematics which Merleau-Ponty hoped were in the process of being 
superseded. 
Whatever the response of readers to my representation of Bourdieu’s work in relation to some hypothetical 
antecedents, my intention has been to describe Bourdieu’s intellectual trajectory in a way which will invite 
reflexive auto-analysis.  It is fitting, therefore, to conclude with the sentence with which Bourdieu ends his own 
auto-analysis: 
And nothing would make me happier than having made it possible for some of my readers to recognize 
their own experiences, difficulties, questionings, sufferings, and so on, in mine, and to draw from that 
realistic identification, which is quite the opposite of an exalted projection, some means of doing what 
they do, and living what they live, a little bit better. (Bourdieu, 2004, 142; 2007, 113) 
 
 
1 See Bourdieu, 1989, 17. 
2 I am deliberately connoting here the book published by members of the Bourdieu Study Group of the British 
Sociological Association for which I wrote a Preface (Ingram et al., 2015). 
3 See Robbins, 1991. 
